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ABSTRACT
Social Engineering has become a significant threat to the security of business,
government, and academic institutions. As vulnerabilities to social engineering attacks
increase, organizations must incorporate risk mitigation strategies to their portfolios of
Information Systems Security Countermeasures (ISSC). The goal is to implement
mitigation strategies that balance the cost of implementation, the privacy of employees,
and the resulting expected costs of social engineering attacks. In this paper we develop an
analytical model that calculates the total cost of protection, including the trade-off
between the cost of implementing protection strategies and the resulting expected cost of
social engineering attacks. We use the model to examine the sensitivity of total costs to
various model parameters, including costs of training, knowledge retention and
depreciation rate, and number of employees.
This model builds on prior work from the Ponemon Institute examining the
economic costs of social engineering attacks and the methods implemented to reduce the
risk and mitigate the costs of such attacks. In particular, we leverage the empirical
analysis presented in Ponemon Institute(2015) to develop a model that examines the
economic impacts of various mitigation strategies and the resulting economic trade-offs.
This works illustrates that knowledge and awareness among users is an effective method
for controlling social engineering threats. The scenarios highlighted in this work
illustrated how costs play a role in protection using knowledge as a countermeasure and
found the most cost-effective solutions using the same model used by Ponemon(2015).
iv

This analysis may help companies develop efficient ways to protect themselves from
social engineering attacks while efficiently managing resources in the social engineering
realm.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO SOCIAL ENIGNEERING
Overview of Social Engineering in Cyber Space
Information Technology (IT) Security is of growing importance to businesses,
governments, and academics. Rapid advancements in technology have been a doubleedged sword – on the one hand providing attackers more opportunities to breach security
while on the other hand providing defenders tools to prevent, detect, and address security
breaches. When an organization quantifies its level of IT security, they often attempt to
measure the success rate of detection or prevention of security threats created by a
particular technology. While this may depict the security of a system from a network
perspective, it does not accurately reflect the effectiveness of the security system in the
presence of social engineering. Social Engineering is the use of relationships with people
to attain a goal - in this case, obtaining access to or knowledge of a protected system.
Social engineering essentially bypasses technological protections (e.g., firewalls,
intrusion detection systems) altogether. Technologies implemented to provide security,
automated or not, will at some point require human-computer interaction (HCI). These
interactions provide an opportunity for social engineers to gain important information
that gives them access a system and its data. Therefore, social engineering can be
specifically defined as the methods of influencing users to divulge sensitive information
or performing a task that may present an unforeseen threat to the security of a system.
This threat vector is one of the few in which the threat is not necessarily an insider threat,
1

but could be linked to honest users with limited understanding of the consequences of
their actions. Common examples of social engineering include spearfishing attacks,
pretexting, baiting, and quid pro quo attacks. These attacks involve a social engineer
preying on the trust of a user to provide information that will enable the social engineer to
infiltrate a secured system. The user may not even be aware of the attack since these
attacks are typically embedded in personal interactions with a seemingly non-threatening
individual (such as a customer). Social engineering presents a substantial, often ignored,
threat to the security of IT systems and thus must be considered when organizations build
their portfolio of Information Systems Security Countermeasures (ISSC).
The vulnerability to the risk of social engineering is based on the human
component and can be linked to the lack of knowledge of best practices for technology
use and protection by the growing base of technology users. According to Natalie Ebner
[11] older adults are more susceptible to these kinds of attacks due to declines in
cognitive functions and deception sensitivity. The human component of protection is
vested in the knowledge of the person using the system.

Human Interaction
The user is one of the most important factors affecting the security of a system. In the
2017 Data Breach Investigations Report (2017 DBIR) produced by Verizon, there has
been substantial growth in the use of social attacks to breach security since 2010; in fact,
43% of all security attacks in 2017 involved social engineering. Most individuals that
work around security related information must obtain clearance prior to obtaining access
to systems. Social engineering seeks to take advantage of the human-computer interaction
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by encouraging users to deliver information that may help the social engineer infiltrate a
network. The human aspect of an ISSC cannot be overlooked due to the severity of the
consequences. One uninformed user that falls prey to social engineering may generate
substantial financial harm for a company and its stakeholders (e.g., customers, suppliers,
distributors). According to the 2017 DBIR, only 20% of users falling prey to a phishing
attack reported the suspicious activity as required by company policy. The 2016 Cost of
Cyber Crime Study & the Risk of Business Innovation reports in their study that 70% of
the companies surveyed experienced phishing and social engineering attacks on a
worldwide scale. Phishing and social engineering accounted for 15% of the cyber-crime
costs in the U.S. or approximately $2.6 million per company.
While users are often entrusted to avoid compromising a secured system or
improperly disseminating protected information, these same users often do not
understand the importance or their role in information security (Hong, 2012). For
example, many users are susceptible to attackers who impersonate another employee
(e.g., upper management) to generate an action or obtain some information from the
victim. One popular example was the attack on Ubiquiti Networks in 2015. In this case,
an email spoofing attack successfully convinced employees to transfer up to $46.7
million dollars to a third party overseas account – all without the employees taking
additional steps to confirm the identity of the requester. Threats like these have leveraged
the growing reliance of companies on technology – targeting users with links, on social
media and in emails, that seemingly from the user the attacker is impersonating. While
advances in technological security on some devices has helped to automate the detection
of some of these attacks, defenses always lag behind attacks, leaving the user as the first
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line of detection. Regardless of the situation, the problem either begins or ends with the
user.
As highlighted in Trim (2013) the human operator is susceptible to not only phishing
attacks (as described above) but also other security attacks such as shoulder surfing,
dumpster diving, reverse social engineering, and baiting:


Phishing - duping an e-mail user to reveal personal or confidential information
which the scammer can use illicitly.



Shoulder Surfing – looking over someone’s shoulder to capture information.



Dumpster Diving – obtaining sensitive information, by sifting through discarded
materials, that can be used to compromise a system.



Reverse Social Engineering – setting up a scenario in which the victim would rely
on the attacker to aid them in solving a problem; in this case the attacker
impersonates someone who could help - e.g., an IT Help Desk representative.



Baiting – leaving a malware infected device in a location where a targeted victim
can find it.

Potential victims of a social engineering attacks must be aware of the type of attacks
(see above), the sources/methods of each attack, and the consequences of attack. As
shown in Figure 1.1, there are many different sources of a social engineering attack.
According to Junger, “An important advice is that users need more knowledge about how
attackers operate, hence user education is necessary. In developing user education, it is
important to determine priorities, teaching everything may amount to learning nothing
much.” Such education is likely an important element of an ISSC portfolio that may
4

reduce the likelihood that a user inadvertently becomes a victim of social engineering.

Figure 1.1 Attack Vectors (from Trim & Upton 2013) [10]

But in whom do we invest education? Simply, everyone. Every person ranging
from the CEO of the company to the janitor that never touches a computer must
understand how their behaviors affect an organization’s vulnerability to cybersecurity
attack. Every individual in a company presents some form of social engineering threat to
the company. For instance, an individual without access to any system may
unintentionally deliver a bad USB to a target because someone asked them to do so.
“The Cost of Phishing and Value of Employee Training” report presented by the
Ponemon Institute revealed that the majority of the costs associated with a successful
phishing attack performed is related to losses in employee productivity. According to the
report, for an organization of approximately 9,552 users, at the expected average annual
5

cost of phishing in 2015 was $3.77 million; productivity loss was expected to account for
48% of the loss. The report further implies implementing an annual training program that
yields a 47.75% net improvement will lead to a 50% reduction in total costs or
approximately $188.40 per employee/user. The rate of return is great based on their
parameters, but this is not a universal rate of return nor is it representative of all learning
styles.

The Social Engineering Cycle

The design and execution of a social engineering attack tends to follow a general
framework. The social engineer begins by formulating an attack with a goal. The
information gathering cycle follows and the attacker begins identifying information about
its target until the information is actionable. The preparation then begins for the attack
vector (Trim, 2013) and victim. The attacker then develops a relationship with its victim
and tries to use that relationship to exploit the victim to attain the desired goal. Based on
prior events, the end users should be educated to help them recognize the signs of social
engineering.

Rating an ISSC
An Information Systems Security Countermeasure (ISSC) portfolio (Kumar,
2008) protects a system from threats, reduces downtime, and enables system restoration.
Factors that affect the optimal ISSC portfolio include the cost and effectiveness of the
6

countermeasure, the economic impact of a successful attack, and the probability of a
threat (Kumar,2008). Kumar (2008) calculates the optimal countermeasure portfolio
based on a specific objective – for example, minimizing worst-case costs versus
minimizing expected costs. For an ISSC portfolio to remain effective, it must adapt with
the changing methods of attacks.

Assessing the Social Engineering Threats
Analyzing the risk of a successful social engineering attack comes down to threat
recognition. Can the user recognize the threat as it is occurring? For socially engineered
attacks, can knowledge be used to combat these threats? Using knowledge as a
countermeasure requires the user to draw on their knowledge of what a threat is and how
to respond to them should they occur. Knowledge without application does not benefit
the ISSC. In order for this awareness to be recognized and utilized regularly, users need
to be trained. This training, when bestowed upon users, will serve to empower the users
to leverage their newfound knowledge in practice. The training provided to the users
should be recurring to improve their ability to recognize the threats as recognized in
Knowledge and Practice in Business and Organizations[14]. This will provide users a
chance to continually build upon their knowledge or at a minimum keep up with changes
in the social engineering attacks the user may experience.
The goal is to build individual knowledge and awareness on the subject in order to
understand what the users of a system know about threats and quantify/identify
weaknesses in their knowledge.

7

Figure 1.2: The triangular relationship between power, knowledge, and practice [14]
The concept of an observed score for each user can then be developed to represent more
accurately what a user has learned while taking into account items such as overestimating
or undervaluing the points assigned to a problem. The observed score can then be used as
a basic baseline of the user’s understanding of social engineering. Further evaluation can
then be used to identify what the user base may see as a more significant risk to the
system using a scoring scale. The scoring scale would consider user responses to
questions to understand their level of understanding about certain subjects. Once the
administrator is able to identify a pattern, she can then use the emails or reminders to fill
the knowledge gaps identified by the graded approaches. This is extremely important to a
network of systems where user A may have access to several systems whereas user B
may have access to only one of the systems to which user A has access.
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Figure 1.3 Example of Social Engineering Scheme

Training in Cyber Security

Training is an important aspect of many jobs to ensure that employees learn and
maintain up-to-date knowledge related to their roles and jobs at their company. With the
growth in technology integration across multiple industries, training in cyber security or
best security practices in general has become equally as important to companies
regardless of industry (2017 DBIR). Training helps individuals better prepare themselves
for responding to cyber disasters or identify potential threats prior to the realization of
any damage. The learning from training can take many forms based on the National
Training Laboratories, Learning Pyramid (Strauss, 2013):
1. Lecture – Lectures commonly involve an education talk to a group of
listeners. The knowledge retention rate is averaged to be 5%.
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2. Reading – Reading comes in many forms such as email, newsletters,
reports, etc. Reading information averages a 10% knowledge retention.
3. Audio/Visual – Videos and other forms of multimedia fills this niche and
provide an average knowledge retention rate of 20%.
4. Demonstration – A demonstrator/instructor is demonstrating an
experiment or process to the viewer. The average knowledge retention rate
is 30%.
5. Discussion Group – This involves the students gathering and discussing
the subject at large while providing an average retention rate of 50%.
6. Practice by Doing – The student performs the desired actions to get the
desired outcome. The average knowledge retention rate of practice is 75%.
7. Teach Others/Immediate Use – Making the student the instructor can yield
an average 90% knowledge retention rate for the student teaching.
Based on the Learning Pyramid, we see the many modes of teaching and their “expected”
retention rates. Using these expected retention rates, we can deduce the associated
improvement rate and potential costs and time commitment of each.

The Associated Costs of Training

When considering the economic implications of training users, we must consider
the cost of a successful attack, the costs to train each user, and the rate of return that one
will receive. The underlying variable that directly impacts all costs is time lost to low or
no productivity for each user. The time needed to prepare, disseminate, and evaluate
social engineering training is an important resource that organizations need to manage to
10

maximize the rate of return. There is a need for balance between the cost of training the
users and total cost of the attacks mitigated and with that balance an organization can
defend itself without exceeding an optimal rate of return. Another important factor when
considering the cost of training is the knowledge depreciation of users or the organization
over time. The knowledge depreciation can be caused by numerous factors such as user
turnover or natural depreciation among the users. If the knowledge depreciation rate is
high, then more time/money needs to be invested in ensuring the knowledge retention
rate can support the depreciation.

The Economic Cost Model

The total rate of return for training investment is a function of the cost of the
attacks being mitigated in the year divided by the total cost of providing training. The
cost of attacks, as calculated by Ponemon(2015), involved calculating the cost to contain
malware, the cost of malware not contained, productivity lost due to phishing, the cost to
contain credential compromises, and the costs of credential compromises not contained.
The cost of attacks mitigated can be calculated by finding the product of the net
improvement in knowledge and the initial annual costs of attacks (Ponemon 2015). Net
improvement is calculated by the total improvement provided by the training multiplied
by the knowledge depreciation rate. The cost of training is equal to the time invested into
creating and disseminating the training and the cost of training materials/ knowledge
retention. Time, in this model, will include the time lost in productivity and the time lost
in implementation. These parameters can be manipulated year to year to model the
changes in an organization; the rate of return from year to year can shift depending upon
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the cost of social engineering attacks, the knowledge depreciation rate, and the cost of
training. The models discussed within look to provide further insight into how these
parameters affect the effectiveness and the associated cost of using training to deter social
engineering.

The Modeling Problem

Understanding the how to maximize the value of training for users is necessary
for managers to make a determination in how to approach training (2015 Ponemon
Institute). As seen in the previous section, there are several parameters that can play a
role in determining the effectiveness of various training methods. This evaluation must be
conducted periodically due to changes in attack methods and changes in costs. The cases
examined further in the next chapter of this paper will explore how each of these
parameters can impact the rate of return for organizations.
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Table 1.1 Parameters Explained
Parameters/Equations/Variables Description
t

Time invested in training

c(t)

Cost of training as a function of time and
is the product of time invested in training
and knowledge retention costs.

kr

Average knowledge retention rates of the
users

ω

Rate of return on training investment as
determined be the cost of attacks being
mitigated by training divided by the cost
of training users.

α

The cost of attacks being mitigated which
is calculated by the net knowledge
improvement percentage multiplied by
the costs of the total costs of all attacks
had they been successful.

β

The cost effectiveness of a learning
method.

ε

The net improvement provided by
training which is a function of the
average knowledge retention rates and
the average knowledge depreciation rate
of the users.

kd

Knowledge depreciation rates of the
users.
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CHAPTER 2
MODELING KNOWLEDGE AS A COUNTERMEASURE

We model how knowledge and costs play a role in the selection of training
methods to prevent and mitigate social engineering attacks. The model will take the
aforementioned variables and demonstrate their relationships in practical application. The
model will have one hundred users that require training. Case 1 will examine the
correlation between cost of training parameters, time and knowledge retention, versus the
cost effectiveness as the cost of training increases. Case 1 also looks at the expected net
improvement as the knowledge depreciation rate among users increases. This case takes
Table 2.1 and 2.2 to demonstrate the tradeoffs between the amount of money one can
invest into training and the average knowledge depreciation rate of the users. Case 2 will
examine the expected average rate of return and the cost effectiveness when given the
different learning retention rates as presented by the Learning Pyramid (Strauss, 2013)
and with assigned costs to each learning method. Case 2 seeks to find the practical cost
effectiveness and rate of return of the learning methods to identify the most optimal
method to utilize in a real world application by applying the same methods used by the
Ponemon Institute (2015) to evaluate the utility in training users against social
engineering attacks.
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Assumptions
When working with people there are a lot of variables that can deviate at random
and drastically such as memory loss, illness, or personality that cannot be accounted for
by simulation. However, in this model we assumei each individual user is healthy,
rational, and able to use solid judgement with proper knowledge. None of the users have
malicious intent or seek to compromise the components. The users are adequetely trained
to perform their job role on the component(s) they are allowed to access.
The next assumption is that each of the learning/ training methods are going to
take roughly an hour to participate in for the user. This eliminates the ambiguity of how
much time will be lost in productivity from user to user or the organization as a whole.
This also means that we are assuming that the time to learn something for each user keeps
each user within the allotted average from the Learning Pyramid. The users will receive
the same benefits from the training.
The final assumption is the Learning Pyramid’s accuracy and legitimacy in
organizational learning. The learning pyramid has been challenged in its accurate
approximation of the knowledge retention of users and their wide use of the methods. In
this model, the methods are aligned with the way that learning method would be closely
approached by an organization.
Case 1: Globally Evaluating the Model
Given the average knowledge retention rates based on the learning pyramid, linear
trends are expected as shown in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. For Table 2.2, we illustrate the cost
of attack as the 3.8 million annual average found in the 2015 Ponemon Institue Report.
15

From the trends, it is evident that ,in all cases, the higher knowledge retention rates,
primarily the practice by doing and discussion group methods, will prove the most
rewarding. Since knowledge depreciation is treated as a global variable among users, the
knowledge retention rates can be the driver for maximizing net improvement. The issue
with accepting these results is the real world practicality. In the application of these
results, it is important to acknowledge the different learning methods will not all cost the
same at any given time e.g. to implement the reading method may be as cheap and simple
as sending an email while practice by doing may require an outside firm to train the
employees which could cost significantly more; reading cost effectiveness is greater at
$500 than practice by doing cost effectiveness at $10,000.
Case 2: Applying Knowledge Retention Costs
Acknowledging the real world issue, the models used in this case analysis will be
approximations based on sources. The demonstration and the teaching others methods
have been left out of the model due to either inconclusive approximations of costs or due
to the productivity time lost would be too great to a fairly approximate. Utilizing the costs
of training, Table 2.4 and 2.5 show how cost effectiveness can tell a different story when
given the parameters of costs of training. The cost effectiveness of reading is far superioir
than all other methods due to the ease of electronic publication and/or electronic
messaging. The cost effectiveness of reading could have been lower in some other forms
e.g. providing physical communications to each user. Although reading is the most cost
effective method, it still yields the second lowest rate of return. The other drawbacks of
the reading method is guaranteeing the users will read/receive the electronic
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communication. The secondmost cost effective method is the practice by doing method
which provides the highest rate of return through knowledge depreciation.
Table 2.1 Net Improvement as Knowledge Depreciation Increases
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Table 2. 2 Cost Effectiveness as the Cost of Training Increases
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Table 2.3 Sample Cost of Training Used
Learning Method
Lecture

Cost of Training
$10,000 [24]

Description
Having a social
engineering professional
speak to the users.

Reading

$125 [27]

Creating an email
newsletter to send to the
users.

Audio/Visual

$20,000 [25]

Creating a professional
video discussing the
social engineering
threats.

Discussion Group

$30,000 [26]

Holding several focus
groups led by a trained
facilitator.

Practice by Doing (PBD)

$5.00 per user/ $5000 [19]

Utilizing an outside
company like Wombat
Security to train users.
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Table 2.4 Cost Effectiveness over Knowledge Depreciation

Cost Effectiveness over Knowledge Depreciation
3500

Cost Effectiveness

3000
2500
2000
1500
CE Lecture
1000

CE Reading

500

CE Audio/Visual

0
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%
CE Lecture
CE Reading
CE Audio/Visual
CE Discussion Group
CE PBD

19 17.1 15.2 13.3 11.4 9.5 7.6 5.7 3.8 1.9
3040 2736 2432 2128 1824 1520 1216 912 608.0 304.0
38 34.2 30.4 26.6 22.8 19 15.2 11.4 7.6 3.8
63.33 57.00 50.67 44.33 38.00 31.67 25.33 19.00 12.7 6.3
570 513 456 399 342 285 228 171 114.0 57.0

Knowledge Depreciation Rate

20

100
%
0
0
0
0
0

CE Discussion Group
CE PBD

Table 2.5 Rate of Return over Knowledge Depreciation

Rate of Return over Knowledge Depreciation
80%
70%

Rate of Return

60%
50%
RR Lecture
RR Reading

40%

RR Audio/Visual
30%

RR DG
RR PBD

20%
10%
0%
0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Knowledge Depreciation Rate
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80%

90% 100%

Table 2.6 Table Equations
Table number
2.1

Equation
ε = kr* kd

Description
Identify the organization’s
expected net improvement
knowing the average
knowledge depreciation
levels.

2.2

β = (3800000* kr)/c(t)

Given the annual cost of
social engineering attacks and
the average knowledge
retention rate, one can
determine the cost
effectiveness of a training
method as the cost of training
increases.

2.4

β = (3800000* ε)/c(t)

Application of the costs of
training in Table 2.3.

2.5

ω=ε

Since the cost of an attack
does not impact the rate of
return, rate of return equals
net improvement.
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CHAPTER 3
CONCLUSION OF RESULTS
Conclusion
The use of user knowledge as a countermeasure is an important part of every
ISSC that needs to be approached carefully to maximize the deterrence of social
engineering attacks. Using the models provided, an organization can decide how to
approach user training in a practical real-world application. The models demonstrate that
based on the knowledge retention rates provided there is a linear relationship between the
cost of training and the expected improvement regardless of the knowledge depreciation
rate of the users, yet the knowledge depreciation rate directly affects the cost
effectiveness of the training provided.
For future research, there are several aspects of the application of the models that
can be expanded on. The first thing to expand on is the learning methods and their
accuracy; determining the exact methods that are encompassed in the methods or if the
learning retentions can be further expanded upon for newer learning methods. The second
thing to consider is the impacts of the communication channels utilized for providing the
knowledge e.g. physical/in-person delivery versus electronic or remote training. The third
item to further investigate is how year to year rate of returns may shift due to knowledge
retention, a potential knowledge cap in the users, or a higher turnover rate of users.
Finally, maximizing the rate of return by mixing the training methods based on the
likelihood of a user being targeted for a specific attack. It is important to gauge an
23

individual’s “need to know” basis for training to limit unnecessary training costs; role
based training may produce better cost effectiveness overall.
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